We develop an equilibrium search model of the housing market where sellers may become distressed as they are unable to sell. A unique steady state equilibrium exists where distressed sellers attempt liquidation sales by accepting prices that are substantially below fundamental values.
1 Introduction unlikely to become distressed within a short period of time. Sales taking place long after the listing date are most likely 'distressed', because the longer a seller waits, the more likely he is to become distressed. Since distressed sales occur at lower prices, the aforementioned negative correlation follows.
When constructing the model what we had in mind was the housing market, however the model is applicable in other settings characterized by (i) search frictions, (ii) informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers and (iii) the prospect of becoming distressed. As an example, consider the over the counter (OTC) markets; in particular markets for mortgage-backed securities, bank loans and derivatives among others. These markets share all three of the aforementioned characteristics. Indeed, search is a fundamental feature in many OTC markets, just as it is in the housing market, as it is di¢cult to identify a counterparty with whom there are likely gains from trade. Similarly informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers is a prevalent feature of the OTC markets as buyers' valuations are private information and it is not uncommon at all for parties to simply walk away without trading.
Finally, traders may become …nancially distressed due to, for instance, pressing debt obligations, nearing margin calls, hedging motives or being caught in a "short squeeze". The model, therefore, is potentially applicable in this setting as well and anecdotal evidence suggests that the main results of the paper (…re sales and predation) indeed hold true in the OTC markets. 1 This paper belongs to a literature that studies the housing market using search theory, e.g. see Yavas and Yang [21] , Krainer [14] , Wheaton [19] and Albrecht et al. [1] , among others. The paper by Albrecht et al. is perhaps the closest to our model in terms of motivation and setup; however, it is based on complete information while ours is based on incomplete information. This di¤erence is crucial because incomplete information is key in obtaining the predation result.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we lay out the model. Section 3 presents the predation result, section 4 discusses prices, section 5 discusses liquidity and section 6 concludes.
Model
Time is continuous and in…nite. The economy consists of a continuum of risk neutral buyers and sellers. Each seller is endowed with a house and each buyer seeks to purchase one. Buyers and sellers di¤er in terms of their intrinsic preferences towards ownership of a house, which creates the incentive to trade. For simplicity, we assume that the utility to the seller from keeping the house is zero.
Buyers on the other hand receive periodic dividends (housing services) starting at the period after the purchase of the house and continuing forever. Following the asset pricing interpretation, we assume that the value of a house is captured by the discounted sum of the future dividends.
Sellers' personal circumstances may change for the worse if they are unable to sell for too long a period. All sellers enter the market in regular circumstances, though, eventually as they are unable to sell they might be hit by an idiosyncratic shock and become motivated or distressed. The adverse shock arrives at an exogenous Poisson rate > 0 and may be associated with di¢culties, …nancial or otherwise, forcing sellers into early liquidation. Regular and distressed sellers di¤er in terms of their time preferences. Buyers and regular sellers discount future utility by (1 + ) 1 > 0; whereas distressed sellers are more impatient and discount the future by 1 + 1 < (1 + ) 1 ; which means that > : Sellers do not exit the market until they sell and a distressed seller remains distressed.
The parameters of interest are the frequency of the shock, ; and the severity of the shock, :
Transactions are bilateral and involve a non-trivial search process. At any point in time buyers and sellers meet each other at a constant Poisson rate > 0: 2 Upon inspecting the house, a buyer realizes his own valuation of the house v 2 [0; 1], which is a random draw from the unit interval via c.d.f. F (v) : Buyers are identical in the sense that their valuations are generated by the same random process, however they may di¤er in their valuations for any particular house. This speci…cation captures the notion that di¤erent buyers have di¤erent tastes and preferences and, therefore, will have di¤erent reservation prices. The realization of v 2 [0; 1] is match speci…c, so when buyers search they in fact search for a high v: We assume that v is time invariant; so, once a buyer …nds and purchases a house with a su¢ciently high v then he continues to enjoy the same v forever. We impose log-concavity on the survival function, which is a crucial technical assumption to obtain several key results in the paper. 3 Assumption 1. The density function f (v) is strictly positive, whereas the survival function S : = 1 F is log-concave, that is
The realization of v is unobservable to the seller. The seller only knows the c.d.f. F generating v, so, he advertises a list price l; trading o¤ the probability of sale with revenue. The sale price p (l) ; depends on the list price but may involve a non-trivial renegotiation process (more on this later). If agents agree to trade at price p then the seller receives payo¤ p; the buyer receives dividends v starting at the beginning of the next period and continuing forever; both agents leave the search market and are replaced by a buyer and a regular seller. The replacement assumption is standard in the literature;
it is needed to maintain stationarity. Agents who do not trade receive a period payo¤ of zero and continue to the next round to play the same game.
Sale Price
In the housing market, transactions rarely occur at the list price; the sale price typically involves a hard bargain between the buyer and the seller. We are not particularly interested how agents interact with each other as they negotiate, so we treat the renegotiation mechanism (be it Nash bargaining, strategic bargaining or even some esoteric price formation procedure) as a black box; however, we specify some mild properties that the resulting sale price ought to satisfy. As long as the renegotiation mechanism satis…es these properties our results go through. More formally, let G hl; i denote an extensive form game that induces some expected sale price p If G hl; i has multiple equilibria and, therefore, generates multiple sale prices (which, typically, is the case with bargaining models with private information, e.g. see the survey by Kennan and Wilson 2 What we have in mind is a Mortensen-Pissarides style random matching function where arrival rates are functions of the market tightness (buyer-seller ratio). Typically, one assumes di¤erent measures of buyers and sellers so that arrival rates for buyers and sellers may vary. However, to avoid excessive parameterization, we simply assume equal measures, which means that agents meet each other with the same rate . 3 Log-concavity of the survival function is equivalent to the ratio of the density to the survival being monotone increasing and many well known distributions including Uniform, Normal, Exponential, 2 satisfy this property. See [4] for more details. [12] and the references therein), then we assume that there is an equilibrium selection device that uniquely pins down p (l) : The game, the selection device and the resulting sale price function p (l) are all common knowledge. 1a 1b 1c We admit that the shape of the sale price function should be endogenous and depend on the fundamentals of the market. This paper's purpose, however, is not to explain why a certain pricing practice emerges in this market and not in another. Instead, we want to investigate what happens to prices, volume of trade, and above all, buyers' purchasing behavior when some sellers become distressed. For this purpose, the shape of the sale price function can take any form; all we need is that it satis…es Assumption 2.
We move on to discuss buyers' and sellers' problems. We denote a seller's type by j = r; d (where r refers to regular sellers and d refers to distressed sellers). We focus on a symmetric steady state equilibrium where identical agents follow identical strategies. In particular, a type j seller advertises a list price l j , corresponding to the sale price p j = p (l j ) : Buyers, upon meeting a type j seller, purchase if their private valuation v (willingness to pay) of the house exceeds an endogenous threshold v j :
Buyer's Problem
The problem of a representative buyer has a recursive formulation. We use a dynamic programming approach, letting denote the value of search to a buyer. In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium the distribution of prices p = (p r ; p d ) is degenerate. Clearly is a function of p ; however, we omit the argument when this is understood. We have
A buyer's lifetime utility from owning a house that yields v per period equals v= . The parameter is the endogenous fraction of distressed sellers; so, with probability a buyer meets a distressed seller who sells for p d : If the consumer surplus v= p d exceeds the value of search then the buyer purchases, otherwise he walks away. Similarly, with probability (1 ) the buyer encounters a regular seller who sells for p r : Again, if the consumer surplus exceeds the value of search then the buyer purchases, otherwise, he keeps searching.
For any given sale price p j we conjecture an associated reservation value
such that the customer purchases only if v v j : The implication is that a buyers' search process amounts to …nding a house with a su¢ciently high v. Obviously, not all meetings result in trade;
for trade to occur the house must turn out to be a good match for the buyer, which happens with probability
A high v j means that buyers are unlikely to purchase (they are selective). Observe that there are two types of trading frictions in the model. The …rst is locating a vacant house, which is captured by the meeting probability ; and the second is whether the house, once found, is a good match, which is captured by the probability S (v j ) : 4 Inserting the reservation values into and using integration by parts we obtain
Fraction of Distressed Sellers
The steady state fraction of distressed sellers, ; is endogenous and can be obtained by equating the in ‡ow into the pool of distressed sellers to the out ‡ow from the pool. The in ‡ow equals to (1 ) ;
whereas the out ‡ow is S (v d ) : Therefore,
Observe that depends on arrival rate of the adverse shock, ; and meeting probability, . It is easy to see that rises in and falls in : More importantly, depends on the probability of trade
which is endogenous and controlled by buyers. Observe that buyers can squeeze the out ‡ow and raise by becoming more selective (i.e. by raising the threshold v d ). Put di¤erently, buyers can strategically slow down the speed of trade and, thereby, cause more sellers to become distressed. This is the basic mechanism behind the predation result in Section 3.
The Lemma has two implications. First, buyers' value of search falls as the market becomes less liquid, i.e. falls as v r and v d go up. Second, sellers face a trade-o¤ between revenue and liquidity.
Indeed, the indi¤erence condition (1) implies that dv j dp j = 1 @ =@v j > 0; which says that the higher the price, the higher the threshold v j . From seller's perspective, raising sale price p j (by advertising a higher l j ) brings in a larger revenue, but lowers the chance of a sale. The seller's task is to …nd a balance between these two e¤ects, which we discuss next.
Seller's Problem
A type j = r; d seller advertises a list price l j taking as given the sale price function p ( ) and buyers' search decisions. The value functions are given by Conjecturing that p j j , a type j seller solves
taking as given.
The value functions are linked to each other and, therefore, it requires some algebra to solve the maximization problems. A complete analysis is provided in Appendix I; here, we simply record some key steps. The FOC of seller j = r; d is given by
Using the FOC and manipulating the value functions with straightforward algebra one can obtain pro…t maximizing sale prices for regular and distressed sellers
Notice that the upper case P r and P d denote the pro…t maximizing prices and the lower case p r and
The Lemma has two implications. First, the negative relationship between prices and reservation values re ‡ect the aforementioned trade-o¤ between revenue and liquidity. For low values of v j the probability of a sale is high, so sellers can a¤ord to charge high prices; however, as v j rises, liquidity concerns are initiated and prices fall. Second, a type j seller is more sensitive to his probability of sale than the other type is, which is why @P d =@v d < @P r =@v d and @P r =@v r < @P d =@v r : Now, we are ready to close down the model.
De…nition 3 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the pair v = (v r ; v d ) satisfying 
Distressed Sales and Predation
Proposition 4 A steady state symmetric equilibrium exists and it is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers accept lower prices and sell faster than regular sellers; more speci…cally p d < p r and S (v d ) > S (v r ) : If the shock becomes more severe then prices fall even further and trade speeds up (i.e. dp j =d < 0 and dS(v j )=d > 0):
A distressed home owner is impatient to sell, which is why he undercuts his competitors. The price cut produces the desired outcome. Indeed S (v d ) > S (v r ) implies that distressed home owners are more likely to sell than regular home owners. The signs of the derivatives suggest that the more painful the shock, the lower the price and the quicker the trade. The simulation in Figure 6c provides further insight on this, where we plot a distressed seller's percentage wise pro…t loss against the severity of the shock : The pro…t loss is measured by We will come back to this point later in Section 5 when we discuss liquidity.
There is a particular study by Glower et al. [11] that we would like to mention here. The paper's goal is to determine the e¤ects of seller motivation on prices, the time on the market, the speed of trade, etc. To do so, the authors survey sellers in Columbus, OH area to obtain information on sellers' motivations by asking whether or not they have a planned date to move out or they accepted a job o¤er elsewhere or they bought another house. The conclusion is that motivated sellers accept lower prices and sell more quickly. This seems to be consistent with the preceding discussion.
Proposition 5
We have dp j =d < 0 and dS(v j )=d < 0 for j = d; r: If the adverse shock starts to arrive more often then prices fall, yet buyers hold o¤ purchasing and strategically slow down the speed of trade, which in turn rises the percentage of desperate sellers in the market and reduces prices even further-an outcome which we term as 'predation'.
When rises regular sellers face a higher likelihood of becoming distressed in the future. They accept lower prices to sell quickly before being hit by the shock, which is why dp r =d < 0 (one can call this the 'spill-over e¤ect' of distressed sales on regular sales). Desperate sellers, on the other hand, face sti¤er competition. Indeed the percentage of desperate sellers rises with the arrival rate of the adverse shock , so, realizing that there are many other sellers in the same dire situation, desperate sellers are forced to cut their already low prices. This is why dp d =d < 0:
Customers, on the other hand, exhibit what we call predatory buying; they delay purchasing despite falling prices. The reason is that, unlike sellers, buyers bene…t from the growing : 5 Realizing that there are plenty of good deals in the market (higher ) buyers …nd it optimal to search longer, which means that they become more selective and increase thresholds v r and v d . This response has a spiral e¤ect. By raising the thresholds, buyers strategically slow down the speed of trade, causing more sellers to become distressed. The growing puts additional downward pressure on prices and the speed of trade, and so on.
The argument can be better understood by decomposing the e¤ect of as follows.
indirect e¤ect due to buyers' behavior
The …rst expression-the "direct e¤ect"-captures the partial change in price p j , ignoring the change in buyer's purchasing behavior. In the proof we show that which are controlled by buyers. In the proof we establish that this indirect e¤ect is always negative which means that buyers' becoming more selective triggers further price cuts.
Predation is well documented in …nancial markets, see for instance Attari et al. [3] , Brunnermeier and Pedersen [5] or Carlin et al. [7] , Ozcan et al. [17] among others. Casual observations suggest that 5 Buyers' value of search increases in : In the proof of Proposition 5 we establish that > 0:
in the real estate market, too, various forms of predation take place. Newspaper stories abound about potential buyers delaying their purchase and waiting for the 'right time' to enter the market. The number of such stories seems to have escalated during the recent housing crisis where, presumably, the arrival rate of the adverse shock went up. These observations seem to be consistent with the implications of the model. To the best of our knowledge, predation is not empirically documented in the real estate market.
Prices

Price Trajectories
According to the model, for any given property the trajectory of the list price is either ‡at or looks like a step function with a sizeable jump-down. Some sellers manage to sell without becoming distressed; so, for those properties the trajectory remains ‡at, throughout. Others, however, are hit by the adverse shock, so they have trajectories that look like a step function. al. [16] ). Sellers wait, on average, 11 weeks to modify prices and reductions can be as high as 10%.
These sizable and infrequent price revisions are inconsistent with most of the theoretical literature.
Indeed existing models imply that, in equilibrium, either sellers never revise the price (e.g., Arnold
[2], Chen and Rosenthal [8] , Yavas and Yang [21] ), or they gradually lower it in a continuous fashion (Coles [9] ).
The Negative Relationship between Duration and Expected Sale Price
Merlo and Ortalo-Magné [15] document a negative correlation between sale price and duration of the sale (the longer the time on the market, the lower the sale price). This fact, again, is inconsistent with most of the existing theoretical models. Our setup provides a simple explanation: If a property is sold shortly after the listing date then it is most likely a regular sale. Indeed, given the Poisson arrival process, the owner is unlikely to become distressed within a short period of time. On the other hand, if the sale occurs long after the listing date then most likely it is a distressed sale. The longer the wait, the more likely is a seller to be hit by the shock. Since distressed sales occur at lower prices the aforementioned negative correlation follows. Below, we make these arguments more precise.
Consider a seller who enters the market at time 0 (wlog). The probability that he remains nondistressed without a sale until time t is given by r (t) = e ( + r )t :
The probability that he becomes distressed at some time y t while he is still unable to sell at t equals to
where e y is the density of transition time y (exponential pdf). Now, consider all sales completed with duration t: The fraction of distressed sales equals
One can easily verify that g rises in t (see the proof of Proposition 6), i.e., the longer the duration, the more likely sellers are to be distressed.
An immediate corollary is that the expected sale price falls with the duration. To see this more precisely, de…ne the expected sale price
and the variance
Proposition 6 The expected sale price p (t) is monotone decreasing and the variance 2 (t) is humpshaped in t:
Figures 3a and 3b simulate p and . But before we proceed, let us outline which parameter values are used in these and subsequent simulations. The justi…cation for these values comes from Merlo and Ortalo-Magné [15] .
p (l) = 0:96l : The sale price p (l) equals to the 96% of the list price l: This follows from the observation that properties in [15] 's sample sell at about 96% of their listing price.
= 0:11 : In the sample in [15] the time it takes to meet a buyer is about 9 weeks, so we set = 1=9; which is about 0:11.
= 0:09 : Before a price change sellers wait 11 weeks on average. We interpret the price change as a result of becoming distressed, so the the frequency of the shock = 1=11; which roughly equals to 0.09.
The continuously downward slope in p may be somewhat misleading and may create an illusion that the transaction price continuously falls with respect to duration. We emphasize that an individual transaction price trajectory is piecewise ‡at with a discontinuous drop from p r to p d at the time the seller is hit by the shock. It is the expected price that falls monotonically; the transaction price is either p r or p d : 
Liquidity
The working de…nition of liquidity in this paper is the capacity of how fast one can sell a property without any 'loss in value'. There are two aspects of liquidity that we are interested in: speed of trade and pro…t loss in liquidation sales. The former can be measured either by probability of sale 
which is distressed seller's percentage-wise pro…t loss compared to regular seller. A high value of z means that distressed sales occur far below regular sales, which indicates illiquidity. Below, we discuss the performance of these proxies within the context of liquidation sales and predation.
Time on the Market: T OM
We know that during periods when goes up customers exhibit predation and the probability of trade falls. So, one naturally expects T OM to go up in such times because sellers are less likely to trade but things are more subtle than that. Because of the rising more sellers become distressed and distressed sellers trade faster than regular sellers. This transition e¤ect puts a downward pressure on T OM and blurs the picture: Below, we make these arguments more precise.
Proposition 7 Density of time on the market is given by
The pdf is hump-shaped if >
and monotone decreasing, otherwise. The time on the market is given by
Now, we can analyze how T OM responds to a change in . We have
The …rst two terms are positive because of the earlier predation result. The last term, however, is
which simply re ‡ects the fact that distressed sellers trade faster than regular sellers-con…rming our intuition about the aforementioned transition e¤ect. Analytically, it is di¢cult to sign dT OM=d but numerical simulations suggest that the transition e¤ect is, in fact, more dominant; see Figure 4a .
Why is this important? T OM is one of the most frequently used and referred statistics in the housing literature. Low values of T OM are interpreted as an indication of high liquidity e.g. Krainer [14] , Knight [13] , Taylor [18] . Going with this interpretation the fact that dT OM=d < 0 indicates that the market becomes more liquid during times where many sellers become distressed and attempt …re sales. It appears that in this particular setting the probability of trade for individual sellers j is a better proxy of liquidity than T OM . In data j is the percentage of meetings resulting in a sale and it clearly falls with : 6 This, in turn, means that the market becomes less liquid if rises. Finally, note that the density function is endogenous and it is derived from maximization behavior of buyers and sellers. Note that is skewed to the right because of the Poisson arrivals and it may 6 Observe that
be hump-shaped if the ratio = is su¢ciently large, i.e. if buyers are scarce and the adverse shock is frequent (Figure 4b ). The shape of is indeed realistic. Merlo et al. [16] , based on transaction data from England, obtain the empirical distribution of times to sale, which is right skewed and hump-shaped; see Figure 2 .3, therein.
Pro…t Loss: z
Figures 5a and 5b below illustrate z against the frequency and the severity of the adverse shock. The simulation in 5a suggests that attempting a liquidation sale is, in fact, less costly when is high. The reason is simple. During such times regular sellers, afraid of becoming distressed, substantially lower their prices to sell quickly and exit the market. This is the aforementioned 'spillover e¤ect' of liquidation sales onto the regular sales. Regular sellers are more sensitive to a rise in than distressed sellers. Distressed sellers do not worry about being hit by the shock because they are already distressed. So, although both prices fall; the drop in p r is sharper than the one in p d , which is why z declines in :
Again, one has to be careful when interpreting this rather positive-looking result. In absolute terms, all sellers are worse o¤ (all prices fall in ): Only in relative terms, distressed sellers appear to be better o¤.
The relationship between z and is more straightforward. The simulation in Figure 5b suggests that if the shock is mild ( ) then a liquidation sale is not too costly; however, as the shock starts to bite ( ), then distressed sellers face considerable losses. The reason is that desperate sellers are directly a¤ected by a rise in , whereas, regular sellers worry about only because they may become desperate in the future. The fall in p d is sharper than the one in p r ; which is why z goes up:
Conclusion
We have presented an equilibrium search model with three distinctive characteristics: (i) trade is decentralized; agents search for a counterparty to trade, (ii) a buyer's willingness to pay is private information and (iii) sellers may become …nancially distressed as they are unable to sell. We have found that, once distressed, sellers attempt liquidation sales by accepting prices that are substantially below fundamental values. In addition, during periods where a large number of sellers are forced to liquidate customers strategically hold o¤ purchasing and slow down the speed of trade in an e¤ort to obtain better deals-an outcome which we call predatory buying. The model suggests several proxies measuring liquidity, which we discuss in detail. Interestingly, the expected time on the market (TOM)
appears to be doing a poor job in measuring liquidity. Indeed, we show that TOM falls during periods of predatory buying, which simply says that the market becomes more liquid with predation. We argue that, in this context, the percentage of pro…t loss in liquidation sales is a better proxy of liquidity than TOM.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Observe that does not depend on v r : Hence
which clearly is negative: Now consider
where
To show that @ =@v d < 0 it su¢ces to demonstrate that
Omitting the argument and di¤erentiating with respect to v d we have
which is positive under Assumption 1: Since increases in v d and (1) = 0; it follows that (v d ) < 0,
Maximization Problems of Distressed and Regular Sellers Distressed Sellers. We start with the distressed sellers' problem. Note the followings:
The sale price p is a function of l; p j simply stands for p (l j ) : Because of Assumption 2 we have p 0 j > 0:
Sellers take as given, thus 0 = 0:
Keeping the preceding points in mind di¤erentiate d with respect to l d to obtain
The FOC is given by
Substitute the FOC into the expression for d to obtain
Expressions (14) and (15) together imply that the pro…t maximizing price P d equals to the expression on display at (7) . To verify the second order condition, di¤erentiate the expression 0 d above and use the FOC (14) along with the fact that 0 d = 0 to obtain (we omit the argument v d where understood):
The …rst multiplicative term is negative, whereas the second term is positive because of log-concavity:
It follows that 00 < 0; thus the solution to the …rst order condition yields a maximum.
Regular Sellers. The problem of a regular seller is similar. We have
Di¤erentiate r with respect to l r to obtain the …rst-order condition (imposing 0 = 0 d = 0 since they are taken as given):
The second order condition can be veri…ed similarly. Use (15), (16) and (17) to get
Substitute r into (17) to obtain the pro…t maximizing price of a regular seller, given by (6).
Proof of Lemma 2. Di¤erentiate P r and P d ; given by (6) and (7), with respect to v r and v d to obtain:
where S j := S (v j ). The expression 
which contradicts the equilibrium condition
For future reference we note that
The rest of the proposition, namely the claims dp j =d < 0 and dS(v j )=d > 0, are proved below.
Proof Omit the superscript and note that (General Implicit Function Theorem)
; for any u = ; and j = r; d;
where (22) and (23)):
It follows that
Below we investigate the signs of the determinants. To do so we need the following partial derivatives.
Partial Derivatives. Here we obtain the partial derivatives of ; P d and P r with respect to and :
To start, di¤erentiate ; given by (2) , to obtain
Notice that @ @ is positive since v r > v d . Now di¤erentiate P r and P d ; given by (6) and (7), to obtain
Note that f j and F j stand for f (v j ) and F (v j ). The signs of the …rst three expressions are obvious.
To see why @Pr @ < 0 focus on the inequality above in (21) and notice that @Pr @ is negative if in (21) the expression in square brackets is positive. The term
in (21) is negative because S=f decreases in v (log-concavity) and v r > v d . Therefore the expression in square brackets in (21) must be positive.
Reserve Values v r and v d . Now we can investigate the signs of dv j =d and dv j =d : To do so we need to determine the signs of det B j and det B j ( ) :
Since @ =@ = 0 we have
Furthermore, since
Because @P d =@ = 0 we have
Since
it is easy to verify that
The expressions for
are given by (13) , (18) and (20) . Using these, one can
show that the expression inside the square brackets equals to
The …rst term is positive because of log-concavity and the second term is positive since 0 > 0 and v r > v d : It follows that det B r < 0 =) dv r =d < 0: Thus dS(v r )=d > 0:
The …rst term is positive since
The second term is also positive since @ d =@v d < 0 and @P r =@ < 0. It follows that det B r ( ) > 0 =) dv r =d > 0: Hence dS(v r )=d < 0:
Finally, we investigate the signs of dp j =d and dp j =d :
Prices. Totally di¤erentiating p j with respect to one obtains dp
Recall that
Hence dp j =d < 0: To show dp j =d < 0; recall that p j = v j = in equilibrium. Di¤erentiation with respect to yields dp j
which is negative since dv j =d < 0 and @ =@v j < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Notice that dp (t)
It follows that p 0 < 0 since p r > p d : Finally note that
Clearly d 2 =dt shares the sign of the expression in the square brackets, since p r > p d . One can verify that lim t!0 g (t) = 0 and lim t!1 g (t) = 1 so that lim t!0 p (t) = p r and lim t!1 p (t) = p d . It follows that d 2 =dt is positive for t small and negative for t large because g 0 > 0 and p 0 < 0. In other words 2 …rst rises and subsequently falls with t:
Proof of Proposition 7. Using (9) and (10) one can obtain density of time to sale and expected time to sale T OM . We have
[r (t) + % (t)] dt and = [dr (t) + d% (t)] =dt:
Basic algebra reveals that T OM and are given by the expressions on display in Proposition 7. It is easy to verify that is positive and that Notice that the denominator could be either positive or negative. First note that lim t!1 0 < 0; i.e., is monotone decreasing for t large. Now evaluate lim t!0 : Note that in the …rst line the exponential term is minimum when t = 0 whereas in the second line it is maximum when t = 0. Hence
Clearly if 0 (0) > 0 then …rst rises and then falls (hump-shape). Otherwise if 0 (0) < 0 it falls monotonically.
Appendix II: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Proof. We will …rst demonstrate that 
These inequalities follow from the facts that 
